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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
French public companies make use of twomanagement structures. As is the situation in themajority of cases, they may have a single board of
directors, but according to Article L225–57 of the French
Commercial Code, they may adopt the dual board system
either originally, or by a subsequent modification of their
statutes. Under both board systems, a distinction may be
made between the management and controlling functions.
In the past, the management of a single board company
was carried out in practice by the chairman of the board
(président directeur general or PDG) and a number of executive
officers (directeurs généreaux délégués), but it is now possible
for the managerial function to be given to another person.
The other members of the board exercise a controlling
function and have only a theoretical right to manage. In the
two-board system, the supervisory board exercises a
controlling function, whilst the executive board is
responsible for management. Under both systems the
general meeting retains certain controlling rights. Thus, in
accordance with Article L232–1 it is responsible for the
approval of the annual accounts and the management
report: by Article L232–12, it is responsible for the
apportionment of the profits.
The distinction between the management and
controlling functions is more clearly defined under the dual
board system than it is under the single board system.
However, whilst it appears true to say that the duties and
liabilities of the members of the supervisory board are less
burdensome than those of the members of the board of
directors (executive board) all such persons are subject to
similar rules in particular areas, for example in relation to
agreements with the company, and the age limit for holding
office. These have been a number of changes in the rules
concerning the boards of a public company and their
members, in recent years, in particular by Law No
2001–420 of 15 May 2001: there was further legislation in
2002 (Law no 2002–1303 of 29 October 2002) and in
2003 (Law no 2003–706 of 1 August 2003). These laws
amended the French Commercial Code. Such alterations
have not taken place in the law concerning the
management of a private company, although there have
been changes in the law relating to the capital of such
companies, making it unnecessary for such companies to
have a nominal capital.
THE SINGLE BOARD SYSTEM
Both natural and legal persons may be directors of
public companies. The directors and permanent
representatives of legal persons who are appointed as
directors are required to hold qualification shares in the
company in accordance with its statutes. An exception is
made for employee directors appointed in accordance with
Article L225–23 of the Commercial Code when employee
shareholding reaches 3 per cent. Such directors are
appointed from the employees who are shareholders. A
person who is not a shareholder may be elected as a
director, but he is deemed in accordance with Article
L225–25 to have resigned unless he becomes a shareholder
within three months. The first directors are designated in
the statutes except in the rare case when the company is
formed as a public one, in which case Article L225–18
provides that they are appointed by the members. All other
directors are appointed by the general meeting.
The total number of directors of a public company must
be not less than 3 and no more than 18. There are two
exceptions to this principle which are contained in Article
L225–17. These are for directors appointed by employees
who are shareholders in accordance with Article L225–23,
and representatives of the employees appointed in
accordance with Article L225–27. The former type of
director is only appointed when employee shareholding
reaches 3 per cent of the share capital. By Article L225–27,
no more than four such representatives may be appointed
to the board of directors if the statutes so permit. Such
appointment will take place by the personnel of the
company and of its French subsidiaries. This membership
may be increased to five in the case of companies whose
shares are admitted to dealings on a regulated market, but
in no case may exceed one third of the number of other
directors.
Directors who are appointed by the statutes cannot hold
office for more than three years: if they are appointed by
the general meeting, this period is increased to six years.
These periods are provided for by Article L225–18, which
also provides that directors may be re-elected unless the
statutes otherwise provide. According to Article L225–19,
the number of directors who are more than seventy years
old may not exceed one third of the directors holding
office, unless the statutes otherwise provide. Furthermore,
unless they do so, when this proportion is not maintained,
the oldest director is treated as having resigned. 9
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A director’s office may terminate by retirement or
dismissal. Although this position may be subject to
criticism the French courts have decided that, by reason of
certain principles of the law of agency contained in the
Civil Code, dismissals may take place at any time by a
resolution of the shareholders ordinary or extraordinary
general meeting. This right cannot be restricted by the
statutes or otherwise, and damages are only available if the
dismissal occurred in prejudicial circumstances.
The general meeting may grant the directors a global
sum for attendance fees (jetons de presence), and they may
pay themselves reasonable remuneration for special tasks.
It follows from Article L225–22 that an employee of the
company may become a director and retain the benefit of
this employment contract if it involves effective work, and
his duties as an employee relate to a field of activity or
responsibility other than as a director. A natural person
cannot in principle serve on the board of directors of more
than five public companies having their registered office in
France. However, an exception to this rule contained in
Article L225–21 exists where a natural person who is the
director of a public company is also the director or
member of the supervisory board of one or more of its
subsidiaries with the meaning of Article L233–16. Such
offices in unquoted subsidiaries are treated as constituting
one for the purposes of Article L225–21, provided they do
not exceed five. Legal persons may hold any number of
directors’ offices.
According to Article L225–35 of the Commercial Code,
the board of directors determines the scope of the
activities to be carried on by the company, and supervises
their execution. Subject to the limitations imposed by a
company’s objects and the powers which are expressly
granted to the general meeting (for example the approval
of accounts), it has the power to deal with all questions
involving the proper running of the company, and
deliberates on matters which concern it. However, the
board has limited itself in practice to defining the policies
to be followed by the company. It carries out such controls
and investigations as it thinks fit.
The business of the company is carried out by the
directeur général, who may be a different person from the
chairman, and by the executive officers (directeurs généraux
délégués). As far as third parties are concerned limitations
on business transactions imposed on the board by the
statutes or otherwise have no effect, even where such
transactions fall outside the ambit of the company’s
objects, unless it can be proved by the company that the
third party knew that the transaction was outside the
company’s objects, or that such person should have known
of this in the circumstances. Each director must be given
all the information necessary to carry out his tasks, and all
the documents that he deems necessary.
The board of directors are given specific powers and
duties, for example preparing the annual accounts and
drawing up an inventory of the assets (Article L232–1);
calling general meetings (Article L225–103), and
authorising all agreements between the company and its
directeur général, one of its directors or executive officers
(directeurs généraux délégués), or with a shareholder
possessing more than ten per cent of the voting rights, or,
if the latter is a corporate shareholder, agreements with its
controlling company (Article L225–38). It is also
responsible for appointing and dismissing the chairman of
the board and the executive officers in accordance with the
provisions of Articles L225–47 and L225–53.
The chairman (president du conseil d’administration), who is
responsible for organising and directing the work of the
board and supervising the functioning of the company
organs, must be a natural person, and is appointed by the
board of directors and may be reappointed. According to
Article L225–47, his appointment may be terminated by
the board at any time. The age limit is 65, unless the
statutes contain a different provision (Article L225–48). A
similar rule is made applicable to chairman (Article
L225–54). The latter person, or another individual, may
act as directeur général. The possibility of separating these
two offices seems in accordance with modern ideas of
corporate governance.
A person may not, according to Article L225–54–1,
hold the office of directeur général in more than one
company having its registered office in metropolitan
France. There are exceptions to this rule which are
applicable to the holding of one such office as directeur
général or sole directeur général of a subsidiary of the relevant
company, and for holding office as the directeur général or
sole directeur général of an unquoted company. The
restrictions on the appointment of employees as directors
which have been mentioned above also apply to the directeur
général.
According to Article L225–56, the directeur général has
the widest powers to act on behalf of the company in all
circumstances. He may not, however, encroach on the
powers given to the general meeting or the board of
directors by law, and is only permitted to exercise his
powers within the limits of the company’s objects.
Nevertheless, his acts bind the company in relation to third
parties in the same way as acts of the board of directors do.
Article L225–53 provides that the maximum number of
executive officers (directeurs généraux délégués) who can be
appointed to help the directeur général is five, and they are
appointed by the board on the proposal of the directeur
général. By Article L225–56 their powers in relation to
third parties are the same as those of the directeur général.
According to Article L225–55, they may be dismissed at
any time by the board on the proposal of the directeur
général. Article L225–55 also provides that if the latter dies,
resigns or is dismissed from office, or is prevented from
exercising his powers, they retain office until a new directeur
général is appointed, unless the board decides otherwise.10
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When a director is an executive officer, this office
terminates with his directorship. Executive officers have
the same powers as the chairman, as far as third parties are
concerned.
THE DUAL BOARD SYSTEM
By Article L225–57, this system is only applicable if
provided for in the company’s statutes. It is now used by
some large French companies, including Peugeot. The
rules relating to traditional companies apply to companies
having a dual board system with its exception of those
contained in Articles L225–17 to Article L225–56, which
apply to the single board. The executive board or directoire
is collectively responsible for the management of the
company’s affairs, and corresponds to a certain extent to
the directeur général of a company having a single board.
Article L225–58 provides that the maximum number of
members of the executive board is five, which is increased
to seven in the case of companies whose shares are
admitted to quotation on a regulated market. The number
of members of the board is fixed by the statutes, and if they
contain no relevant provision, by the supervisory board. If
a public company’s capital is less than 150,000 euros, the
executive board may consist of one person (directeur général
unique). The person who presides over meetings is called
the president du directoire.
The members of the executive board must be natural
persons, but need not be members of the company. They
may be employees of the company at the time of their
appointment, or become so subsequently. However, it
follows from Article L225–74 that they may not be
members of the supervisory board of the same company.
Subject to exceptions for membership of one board of a
company controlled by the relevant company, and for
membership of the board of an unquoted company, Article
L225–67 provides that it is only permissible to serve on
the executive board of one French public company.
According to Article L225–62, the members of the
executive board are appointed by the supervisory board for
a period of between two and six years. By Article L225–61,
they may be removed by the general meeting, and if the
statutes so provide, by the supervisory board. Should such
removal be without just cause, it will give rise to damages.
It follows from Article L225–64 that the members of
the executive board may act collectively and bind the
company in relation to third parties, in the same way as the
board of directors of a traditional company. However, by
way of exception, Article L225–68 provides that certain
transactions require the approval of the supervisory board
to be valid, such as the giving of guarantees, the sale of real
property, or the creation of mortgages and charges over the
company’s assets. In addition, it also follows from Article
L225-68 that (as in the German double board system), the
statutes may provide that the conclusion of certain other
transactions requires the consent of the supervisory board.
By Article L225–66, restrictions placed on the power of
representation of the chairman of the executive board or
the sole member thereof (directeur général unique) cannot be
invoked by the company against third parties. The statutes
may empower the supervisory board to confer the same
power of representation with respect to third parties on
one or more members of the executive board, who are
then called executive officers (directeurs généraux).
The executive board is required by Article L225–68 to
make a quarterly report on its management to the
supervisory board. According to Article L225–100 the
executive board is also required to prepare the company’s
annual accounts and report for submission to the annual
general meeting.
The main function of the supervisory board is to
exercise control over the executive board. Provided that
the statutes so stipulate, representatives of the company’s
employees may be elected to the supervisory board and
according to Article L225–79, they do not count in
determining the maximum of eighteen or the minimum of
three. The number of such members may not exceed four
or one third of the other members in office. Members of
the supervisory board elected thereto from the employees
who are shareholders when employee shareholding
exceeds 3 per cent are also disregarded, in accordance with
Article L225–71, in determining the maximum and
minimum. Legal as well as natural persons may be elected
to the supervisory board, and such persons must,
according to Article L225–76, appoint a person to be a
permanent representative at board meetings.
The first members of the supervisory board are,
according to Article L225–75, designated in the statutes
and hold office for not more than three years. Subsequent
members of the supervisory board, who are appointed by
the general meeting (from among the shareholders) or the
existing employees (from among their number), hold office
for a period stipulated in the statutes, which may not
exceed six years. As in the case of the directors of a
traditional company, the members of the supervisory
board may be dismissed at any time by the general meeting.
A natural person cannot, in accordance with Article
L225–77, belong at the same time to more than five
supervisory boards of companies having their registered
office in France. There are two exceptions to this rule,
which are similar to those applicable to membership of the
executive board.
By Article L225–81, the board elects a chairman and
vice chairman from among its members, who have the task
of presiding over board meetings. Article L225–82
stipulates that resolutions may only be passed if half the
members are present. However, subject to certain
exceptions, the internal rules of the company may provide
that persons who participate by means of audio-visual links
shall count for the purpose of determining quorums and
majorities. The supervisory board is permitted by Article 11
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L225–68(3) to carry out such inspections and inquiries
into the management of the company as it thinks
appropriate, and it may demand access to any document
which it deems necessary. It is also responsible for the
appointment of members of the executive board and their
chairman, and plays an important role in their dismissal.
The supervisory board is also required by Article
L225–68(6) to provide the annual general meeting with
comments on the report of the executive board and the
company’s accounts.
STATUTORY CONTROLS AND LIABILITIES
Directors, directeurs généraux and executive officers
(directeurs généraux délégues) of public companies adopting
the traditional single board system as well as members of
the executive and supervisory boards of such companies
adopting the dual board system are subject to a number of
statutory controls which have features in common. The
purpose of the strict rules governing agreements between
such persons and their company is to avoid a conflict
between the interests of persons concerned and their duty
to the company. According to Articles L225–43 and
L225–91, the making of loans and giving of guarantees by
companies to their directeur général directors and executive
officers (directeurs généraux délégués) or to members of their
executive and supervisory boards where the alternative
dual board system is employed, is prohibited and void. The
same rule applies to the personal representatives of legal
persons which are members of the supervisory board or
board of directors, and to the spouses, ascendants and
descendants of persons covered by the relevant provisions.
These prohibitions do not apply to current transactions
entered into on the usual terms when the company is a
bank or finance house.
The provisions of Articles L225–38 and L225–86 are
concerned with agreements between a company and its
directeur général, one of its directors or executive officers,
and agreements between a company and a shareholder
holding more than ten per cent of the voting rights, or with
the controlling company of a corporate shareholder having
such a holding; and where the dual board system is
employed between a company and a member of its
executive or supervisory board. The relevant provisions are
in very similar terms. Furthermore, they are also applicable
where there is an agreement entered into directly or
indirectly between the company and one of the persons
already mentioned; or between the company and another
undertaking which is owned by a directeur général, executive
officer, director or member of the executive or supervisory
board, or in which such a person is a general partner,
manager, director or member of the executive or
supervisory board.
In cases in which a company has a traditional structure
and the agreement is directly or indirectly with the directeur
général , the directors or executive officers; or with the
holders of more than 10 per cent of the voting rights, or
with the controlling company of a corporation having such
a holding it must receive the preliminary approval of the
board of directors before execution. If the company has a
dual board, and the agreement is directly or indirectly
between a member of the supervisory or executive board
and the company, or between the company and a person
possessing more than ten per cent of the voting rights, or
with the controlling company and the controlling company
of a corporate shareholder having such a holding, it must
be approved by the supervisory board before execution.
Furthermore, Articles L225–40 and L225–88 make it
clear that the contract must be notified to the auditor,
reported on by him, and considered and approved at the
general meeting. The interested party cannot vote on the
agreement at the general meting and according to Article
L225–40(1) and L225–88(2), his shares are not taken into
account for the purpose of calculating the quorum or the
majority. If the agreement is not approved by the general
meeting, the company may claim damages from the
relevant parties (which may include other directors or
members of the executive board) for any loss suffered, even
in the absence of fraud. This proposition follows from
Article L225–41(2) and L225–89(2). However, by virtue
of the provisions of Article L225–41(1) and L225–89(1),
the agreement remains binding on the company unless it is
annulled for fraud.
The rules relating to approval are stated by Article
L225–39(1) and Article L225–87(1) to be inapplicable to
current transactions entered into under normal
conditions. However, such transactions need to be
disclosed to the chairman of the board of directors or the
supervisory board, who must provide a list of such
transactions to the other members of the relevant board.
This requirement does not have to be complied with in
relation to transactions of an insignificant character, having
regard to their object or financial implications.
The chairman, the directeur général, the directors and
executive officers of traditionally managed public
companies, and the members of the executive and
supervisory boards of public companies adopting the dual
board system are also require to comply with a number of
more general rules. They must take account of the
limitations on their powers provided for by law, in the
statutes or otherwise, and refrain from acting outside the
corporate purpose, as well as from taking any action which
is not in the best interests of the company. According to
Article L225–251 (as amended in 2001), the administrateurs
(this term would seem to include directors and members
of the executive board of a company having two boards)
and the directeur général are responsible individually or
jointly and severally, according to the circumstances, to the
company or third parties for breach of the rules of law
applicable to public companies, for breaches of the
company’s statutes and for faults in their management. If
several administrateurs or several administrateurs together with
the directeur général have taken part in the same wrong, the12
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court has the task of determining the contribution of each
party to the damages. Furthermore many types of
dishonest or self-interested behaviour by directors are
classified as criminal offences.
The shareholders may bring an action against the
company if their personal rights have been infringed. By
Article L225–252, minority shareholders may bring a
derivative action against the administrateurs or the directeur
général in the company’s name if the company does not
wish to bring such an action. It follows from Article
L225–253 that the statutes may not subordinate the
brining of such an action to the preliminary consultation,
or the consent of, the general meeting. Individual
shareholders or an association of shareholders with the
meaning of Article L225–120 may bring such an action.
Furthermore, a common representative may bring such an
action in the shareholders name, if such shareholders
represent a stated percentage of the capital, in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 200 and 201 of Decree 67-
236, as amended.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The rules governing the boards of French companies
and their members are complex, and have perhaps been
rendered more so by repeated legislation which has
fortunately been consolidated in the Commercial Code.
The position does not seem very different in the United
Kingdom, where the possibility of revising and simplifying
the complex provisions of Part X of the Companies Act
1985 (as amended) has been the subject of discussion by
the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission,
which published a joint report in 1999 (Cm4436)). There
may be some scope for the simplification of certain
provisions of French law concerning directors and related
matters. In addition, there may be some possibility that the
use of the double board system in France will be stimulated
by legislation implementing the Regulation on the
European Company, and the Directive which accompanies
it, on employee involvement.
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